The Host. The Menorah. Two different religions. Two different holy objects. Are both holy? Is this a situation where the relativist is correct? Is the Host sacred to Catholics, and the Menorah sacred to Jews? I’m inclined to say yes, but there is more to say. Sometimes actions are regarded as sacred: like prayer, or the rite of Confession. But are religions infallible in selecting that which is sacred for them? Is there anything off limits?
Again, I think I am forced to say yes, and my counterexample is human sacrifice which was practiced by the Aztecs of Central America, the Thuggees of India, and many more. Personally, I wouldn’t want to worship a deity that condoned human sacrifice in His name. Anyway, as sacredness does not seem to be an empirically-verifiable property (as far as we know), how do we make headway? What is it that makes an object or action sacred?
At first blush, it seems to be piety; that is, the piety of the individual contemplating or regarding the sacred object or action. In other words, it is a subjective emotional state. But again, there seems to be more involved because, otherwise, we would be left with relativism and there would be no distinction between the piety of the Aztec priest performing a human sacrifice and the piety of a Catholic priest hearing a confession; and maybe, as far as the piety in itself is concerned, that is actually the case. Both are separate acts with very little in common other than that piety, but one involves the death of an innocent human being, the other, not. In my view, the death of an innocent human being should nullify whatever benefit the piety of the Aztec priest provides. In other words, there is a moral concern outside of mere piety alone. Since the sacredness of a thing requires the piety of its participants and nothing else, the ritual human sacrifice, although piously performed, is extraneous to sacredness and piety in itself. In other words, the death of an innocent human being adds nothing to one’s piety in that situation. If the sacred requires piety and nothing more, the human life is wasted without justifiable cause. And that is a serious concern for morality (as opposed to the sacred).
But is that the whole story? It may be objected that the degree of piety is affected by its object. The dearer a thing is, the greater the piety. And what can be dearer than a human life? To be honest, I’ll have to think about that objection. I have no intention of concluding that human sacrifice is just fine and dandy—at the very least, I will object that morality encompasses more than the sacred, and where something might be permissible in light of the sacred, it may be impermissible in light of the moral; hence, no human sacrifice. But in the end, what is sacred and what is not, is not up to me.